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21st

Chavismo:
Century Bolivarian Revolution

Capitalism is not the path. Capitalism is the path to what we have seen and lived through in the last
100 years; that is, a perverse capitalism that makes a minority wealthy and a majority poor. This is
the source, the cause for destabilization and wars at the international and domestic levels.
-Pres. Hugo Chavez of Venezuela on Radio Nacional de Venezuela (3/14/2005)
The 19th century was Europe’s century. The 20th century was the United States’ century. The 21st
century must be Latin American’s century.
-Pres. Luis Inacio Lula da Silva of Brazil
In the eve of current Argentine President Nestor Kirchner’s inauguration, an
unprecedented mass of supporters in Buenos Aires hailed Cuban dictator Fidel Castro’s arrival.
The warm reception, to American outsiders, seemed irrational considering the controversial figure’s
political track record; yet, to the welcoming crowd, they were opening their arms to a man who is
viewed by a portion of Latin Americans as the embodiment of an obstinate crusader against
American infiltration of exploitative capitalism and interventionist foreign agendas. Whether the
labels are true or not, the significance of such a mindset found in the inauguration represents the
rising wave of thought, the initiative for the rest of Latin American to take a firmer stance against
the major powers of the global North, especially the United States. Unfortunately, the antiAmerican sentiment is not new, rather an age-old and emergent perception ingrained in the Latin
American psyche since the yesteryears of the revolutionaries Augusto Sandino, Ernesto “Che”
Guevara, Emiliano Zapata, and Pancho Villa. In fact, according to a recent report from the National
Intelligence Council (an organization under the United States’ Central Intelligence Agency), by the
year 2020 the negative attitude towards the U.S. will mount as Latin America’s economic and
political influence wanes in world affairs, thus continuing to expand the gap between the region and
advanced countries.1 The forecast is not lost on most of Central and South American leaders who
have in one manner or another sustained the initiative to strengthen their ties and enrich the
region.
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Surprisingly, at the forefront of the initiative is not Castro but his ally, President of
Venezuela Hugo Chavez. Perhaps the most controversial figure to date in Latin America, Chavez
is at the head of attempting to create a Latin American front, or as he envisions: “[A] new bloc of
nations to negotiate with the North.”2 The aspiration would appear justifiable in view of the region’s
weak status in the global market and power hierarchy; however, his intentions and methods are
under the constant scrutiny of the opposition based not only in his country, but also in the White
House. In fact, the George W. Bush administration have never shied from expressing their
concerns of Chavez’s political undertakings and radical reforms under his “Bolivarian Revoltion,”
while pointing to his threatening “anti-American” sentiment. From President Bush himself to U.S.
Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, the critics are quick to charge the Venezuelan leader of
undemocratic policies. In April (2005), U.S. Department of State spokesman Richard Boucher put
the consternation into words: “The United States has been concerned about the developments in
Venezuela and of Venezuela in terms of its neighbors.... We think all countries in the region need
to be supportive of democracy and need to call attention to these problems with democracy there.”3
But, how much truth is founded in Boucher’s statement, or for that matter, do the many,
allegations, stemming from all opposing parties, against Chavez’s “Bolivarian Revolution” and
socialist policies merit credibility? The reality of the situation, nevertheless, cannot be easily
rendered without evaluating Venezuela’s significant socio-economic and political changes since
Chavez’s presidency. Yet, investigating his relations amongst Latin American countries becomes
more so imperative in order to decide whether Chavez is actually contributing to establish a more
“united,” stronger Latin America, particularly in South America, or simply forming the Western axis
of evil. In analyzing the aforementioned factors, the examination will ultimately demonstrate if
Chavez can disprove the NIC report, which paints a weak Latin America, and put to rest his critics’
accusations, specifically that of the Bush administration.
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The Initial Stage
Before delving into the Venezuelan leader’s politics, it is essential to note how Chavez’s
1998 electoral victory marked the beginning of a much-welcomed new era. For, the events leading
up to his indoctrination in actuality set the stage for the unlikely candidate, Chavez, who bears no
similar profile to the former presidents of Venezuela. Like many Latin American states during the
1980s, the country found itself with a host of economic and political problems although considered
at the time a wealthy nation (due to oil revenues) and one of the more comparable democratic
government systems to Western Europe.4 When Jaime Lusinchi took office in 1984, the country
was in deep external debt; consequently, pressured by international creditors to seek International
Monetary Fund (IMF) help prior to rescheduling the debt, the president decided instead to impose
his own kind of austerity program to gain the approval of U.S. bankers and investors. In the end, he
would only be able to rollover the loan payments and postpone others, while prompting massive
public rioting due to his austere economic plan and cuts in welfare spending. Lusinchi also made
Venezuela more vulnerable when he allowed foreign investors control the enterprises in order to
get back the investment Venezuela had lost due to capital flight. Gradually, the country was falling
into an economic meltdown. By the 1990s, the U.S. creditors would hold 85 percent of the
country’s foreign debt.5
For the second time, Carlos Andréz Pérez would take office in 1989. Unfortunately, his
election would prove to be the wrong dosage for Venezuela. The economic depression of the
country prompted Pérez to turn to the IMF as he embraced a neo-liberal agenda. In exchange for a
loan, Venezuela entered an austere economic program, which hit the poor the hardest. The
president increased the price of gasoline and the cost of public transportation while simultaneously
cutting welfare expenditures. Class divisions were soon becoming visible. Known as the Caracazo
of 1989, riots broke out, in which 300 to 2,000 people were killed, while a general strike culminated.

Lopez

4

The lasting days of the Caracazo tore the image of the once-stable country into pieces, especially
in view of what really lay behind the political parties in power: corruption.
Since 1958, Venezuela has held a two-party system made up by Accion Democratica (AD)
and Christan Comite de Organizacion Politica Electoral Independiente (COPEI); power alternated
between both although other parties were represented in Congress and local offices. Years of their
political monopoly was not sorely criticized until Venezuela began feeling the economic tribulations
of the late 1980s and onward that prompted sharp cuts in wages and social spending, leading to an
increase in poverty.6 That is, the AD and COPEI governments had unevenly distributed the nation’s
immense oil wealth; as in the historical infamy of oligarchies in Latin America, Venezuela had its
own oligarchy who fought mostly over control of patronage, while also using political discretion to
enable “‘clients’ of the parties to obtain cheap dollars, siphoning an estimated U.S.$11 billion of
hard-currency reserves.”7
Much of this illegitimate wealth distribution could also be attributed to political agendas that
failed to recognize the country’s ultimate social change. That is, Venezuela no longer resembled a
classless society. Before 1980, the nation appeared free of class divisions due to the stable flow of
income provided by oil rents, which provided (to all) the opportunity to benefit materially; in effect,
the petrodollars “financed a positive-sum game” wherein the private sector enjoyed plentiful of
protection and benefits, while the middle to low income groups profited from reduced taxation,
openhanded welfare provision, and blanket subsidies.8 Important to note, as well, Venezuela’s
membership in the Organization of Petroleum-Exporting Countries (OPEC) allowed the country to
reap considerable profit, especially during the 1970s political instability in the Middle East that
increased the oil price tenfold.
It was clear to society there was little to complain about until the tumultuous circumstances
finally destroyed Venezuela’s fragile foundation. Both Lusinchi and Pérez implemented a neo-
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liberal agenda that did not recognize the growing class cleavages; rather, the presidents ignored
the consequences of cutting education, health, and other welfare expenditures in order to finance
an export-oriented economy dependent not on oil, but the private sector. Pérez, specifically,
highlighted the importance of privatizing the state infrastructure and even social security. By the
1990s, the standard of living and education deteriorated for the underprivileged that fell into the pot
of unemployment (due to the cut in oil production and high inflation). Staring the political parties
face to face was a class problem they chose to ignore or not identify [with], particularly the faces of
a populace growing in numbers:
“...[T]he economic pie progressively shrank, it came to be distributed more unequally. The
income share of the poorest 40 percent of the population fell from 19.1. percent in 1981 to
14.7 percent in 1997, while that of the wealthiest decile increased from 21.8 to 32.8
percent.... In short, during a period of generalized macroeconomic decline, income
became more highly concentrated, and society became more sharply divided between elite
and popular sectors.”9
All these factors gradually constructed two primary devices that would contribute to
Chavez’s electoral win. One, the economic deterioration of the ‘80s and the failure of neo-liberal
agendas incorporated by Lusinchi, Pérez (especially), and later Rafael Caldera would taint the type
of economic movement, thus clearing the way for the need for an alternative. Second, as
mentioned earlier, the economic deficiency of the state created more prominent social divisions,
therefore rendering the current class cleavage between the elite or privileged (i.e. upper and
middle classes) and the poor (i.e. lower and lower middle classes). Both of these facts will remain
crucial in understanding the criticism and adoration surrounding Chavez.
Opening the doors for the future president was also his attempt to lead a military coup in
1992. Despite the failure of the coup, his imprisonment provoked sympathy and admiration for the
military conspirator, especially when Pérez was charged with embezzlement. The memorable
attempt offered a gateway into the major playing field of Venezuelan politics. Once pardoned by
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Caldera, the self-proclaimed revolutionary would use the social and political circumstances to
arouse the lower classes.
Enter Chavez
The fact was the poor were in desperate need of a spokesperson, and thus, when the
charismatic paratrooper who came from humble origins began a pseudo-grassroots campaign, the
underprivileged were ready to listen. They saw no reason why they should not considering
Chavez’s background and rhetoric. Born in the Venezuelan state of Barinas (1959), Hugo Chavez
Frias completely shattered the atypical presidential profile of the country by not only coming from a
lower middle-class upbringing, but also by simply being of mixed race. Undoubtedly the
background was attractive to the poor, rural public that suddenly found their alternative party line in
Chavez’s Movimiento Bolivariano Revolucionario 200 (MBR-200). The organization began
essentially as a clandestine group of military officers, with little civilian ties, which gathered to study
national and military history; but more notably, they discussed the current politics and how they
intended to influence it. Not surprisingly, they reflected a leftist perspective that harbored the “goal
of organizing a civil-military alliance in order to stimulate revolutionary change.”10 The occasion
would come upon during AD’s Pérez presidency in February 1992 when Chavez and his military
companions attempted to capture the president. The failed coup uplifted the imprisoned
paratrooper’s fame and that of the MBR-200, and by the time he was pardoned, the political
environment was set for his arrival.
The organization began preparing to run for local and Congressional positions as well as
the presidential office by creating an electoral front called the Movimiento Quinta Republica (MVR),
which integrated independent individuals and other groups holding different ideologies and political
positions, but shared their support for Chavez’s presidential candidacy.11 Yet, the real mobilization
occurred within the regions of the destitute majority, who could no longer identify with the parties
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AD and COPEI, and even Causa R, a political party that emerged during the country’s economic
turmoil attracting labor unions with its leftist and democratic reformist undertones. To the lowincome Venezuelans, Chavez was a much-needed revolutionary figure whose ideological and
political break from the other parties showed promise. He won much support with his antineoliberalism rhetoric and condemnation of the past wrongs committed to el pueblo (the people or
country). The odds were undoubtedly in favor of Chavez, especially when considering the
challenger, Salas Römer, was a Yale-educated elite white whose campaign catered to the upper
class with promises of a 200-say program of shock therapy: “… embracing deregulation of prices,
value-added taxation, fiscal austerity, reductions in the public bureaucracy, and a review of
Venezuela’s membership in OPEC.”12 To the poor, the economic policies seemed all too familiar
and unconvincing. There was no surprise that Chavez’s social democratic platform, carrying
nationalist overtones and promising constitutional revisions, would defeat the opposition.
Upon taking office in February 1999, Chavez initiated his plan for change beginning with a
new constitution and a name change. That is, the country was renamed the Bolivarian Republic of
Venezuela, clearly a tribute to Simon Bolivar (who as we shall see later plays an influential role in
the president’s fundamental rhetoric). Yet, a new nation title was the least of the issues when
considering the entire overhaul of the old constitution. Before a popular referendum inducted the
new document, Chavez was met with an entourage of political parties, various interest groups, and
civil organizations that all wanted recognition of their demands within the contract. After treading
rough waves, the document was drafted within three months, containing both drastic and subtle
reforms, which would be under the careful scrutiny of the emerging opposition.
The points of controversy quickly revolved around the military’s increased role in the state.
The problem was not that the active-duty military members gained the right to vote, but rather the
replacing the old label of an “apolitical” organization into an institution “without political militancy” at

Lopez

8

the service of the Nation as an active participant in the development of Venezuela.13 In a few
words, the president’s critics view the article as a push towards a joint civil-military structure of the
state. The more disconcerting aspect of it concerns the parliamentary body’s lack of authority over
approving military promotions. Chavez, instead, holds the power to oversee the promotions to
generals or admirals. Additionally unsettling to the opposition is the military’s constitutional power
to regulate and control all issues pertaining to weapons (i.e. importation and exportation as well as
storage of arms). Critics of the constitution argue that it “helps concentrate presidential power and
further limits broader political oversight of the armed forces.”14 Although the reforms undoubtedly
strengthened the institution politically, the use of the military in social projects would further
complicate the issue and divide the pro-Chavez constituency and his opponents.
However, before examining the armed forces’ role in social policies, other changes drafted
in the document deepened the opposition’s worries. The new constitution eliminated financing of
political parties, a disadvantage more so for smaller, less-privileged groups. Nevertheless, the
reform was less alarming than the newly gained powers of the president. The constitution allows
Chavez the ability to dissolve the National Assembly, appoint ministers and name their functions
without parliamentary approval, and declare a state of emergency. In addition, the president’s term
was increased from five to six years. Opponents of Chavistas criticized the legislation along with
the military’s empowerment, claiming it was step towards a Castro dictatorship. According to
Chavez supporters, the checks and balances instilled in the constitution prevent complete
concentration of power in the executive body. Articles 71 to 74 of the Venezuelan constitution are
often quoted as evidence of a balanced system. The clauses include four different kinds of
referendums—the consultative, recall, approving, and rescinding:
“Generally referenda can either be initiated by the national assembly, the president, or by
petition from between 10% and 20% of the registered voters. The consultative referendum
is designed to ask the population a non-binding question of a “national transcendent”
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nature, such as whether the country should join a free trade agreement, or a currency
union…. [T]he recall referendum, which can be applied to any elected office… can only be
implemented after half of the term in office has been completed. The approving
referendum, just as the recall referendum, is binding and is used to pass important laws or
to implement treaties that would infringe on national sovereignty.”15
Moreover, the recall referendum is also another form of approving amendments to the constitution,
while the rescinding type does just that, repeals existing laws. The variety of referendums is seen
by Chavez proponents as public accessibility to make institutional and legal changes. Even the
opposition must admit its positive attributes, especially considering their use of the law in 2004 to
unseat Chavez by recall. Although their efforts failed, the attempt in itself demonstrates the
president’s vulnerability, and at another end, it is an illustration of the former colonel’s strong
opposition and even greater loyal supporters. The angst between both parties will be reviewed in
detail later.
Amongst the more neutral issues, however, were the inclusion of environmental and
indigenous rights, updated protection over human rights, an enhancement of the branches of
government, and “the deepening of political democracy through the incorporation of various forms
of direct participation.”16 In the case of the governmental institutions, the constitution created two
new branches, the “Citizen Power” and the “Electoral Power.” The citizens branch, in essence,
holds three major offices—the prosecutor general, the “defender of the people,” and the
comptroller general. Collectively they can challenge any actions by the Supreme Tribunal of Justice
(the judicial branch, which was also restructured) believed to be illegal.17 On the other hand, the
Electoral branch oversees the coordination of elections on all levels. The creation of these two
branches was a personal accomplishment to Chavez who along with his old MBR friends had
envisioned the concepts since their clandestine days.
But, by far the most noteworthy constitutional change, transcending ideologically through
most of the reforms, was developing avenues to establish a participatory democracy, especially for
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the poor. The unfortunate reality before Chavez was a heightened social polarization that had
silenced or ignored the voices of el pueblo or the lower classes. The rhetoric of Chavismo
promised to include the masses while improving their conditions; thus, the constitution includes a
slew of civil rights under Title III, obliging the government to provide social security for the elderly,
disability payments, housing, unemployment insurance, and public health care through financial
contributions.18 The clause also incorporates workers and housewives of the informal economy to
enjoy such benefits. Complementing the ideology behind Chavismo, the constitution also
guarantees the right to sufficient salary (Article 91). In the eyes of the critics, the state was
accumulating too much centralized power through these “interventionist” amendments. Again, they
saw the shadow of Communist Cuba.
Yet, the fact is that Chavez is not entirely a silhouette of the vintage system. His Bolivarian
revolution walks the path of the third way, a combination of recognized capitalism and socialism
harboring communist tendencies. As Chavez puts it, the political effort is a new “socialist model for
the 21st century” that would be, amongst other things, the definitive helping hand to poverty and
underdevelopment. The president has not ignored the necessary ingredients of the free market,
such as privatization, in order to function a well-oiled economy. Still, the leftist ideology is not lost in
the constitution as evident in Articles 301 to 307 where tariffs and subsidies are deemed essential
to the development of the state. At the same time, according to Julia Buxton, the document also
“reformed budgetary procedures and the fiscal management responsibilities of the Central Bank of
Venezuela, while emphasizing the importance of the free market and recognizing private
property.”19 The overall constitutional reforms, however, from the onset were vested in controversy
mainly because of the opposition and their intense (many times personal) dislike of Chavez. There
would be no surprise that his first few years in office would be filled with turmoil, especially as he
began to implement particular social programs and policies.
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The Coup, the oil-strike, the referendum … the opposition (2000-2003)
Between 2000 and 2002, the Chavez administration was sinking in terse waters. In fact,
the moment the Constitution attained the public’s vote and the president gained legislative powers,
the opposition was prepared to destabilize Chavismo. Adding to their ammunition was the
economic environment of the country; for, the electoral and administrative changes of the mega
elections of 2000 (in which Chavez won and acquired the executive seat until 2006) as well as the
social reforms that were delayed had elevated the sense of financial risk, thus the increase rate of
capital flight. Along with a decline in oil prices, the economy was suffering though inflation also
dwindled. The opposition obviously had some leverage. Nevertheless, three factors once
considered illustrate the grayness of the tense environment, which truly question the objective and
justification of the president’s rivals.
For one thing, upon taking office, Chavez was already entering a nightmarish socioeconomic playing field. During Caldera’s presidency, the country was producing high levels of oil
production, yet there was low international demand: “Venezuela’s basket of crude fell $6 between
1997 and 1998 to U.S. $10.57 per barrel and $5 below the projected average oil price in the 1998
budget.”20 The negative effects remained into Chavez’s term, and therefore the former paramilitary
approached the conflict with a complete revision of oil policies; the most notable seen in the
restructuring of PDVSA (Petróleos de Venezuela, Sociedad Anónima), the national oil company,
which falls into the second factor.
Although the PDVSA was nationalized in the 1976, the company was close to being
practically privatized, while raking in little profit due mostly to the squandering of oil revenues. The
fact was that PDVSA’s motto relied on attracting foreign investment, which in other words meant
that lower taxation and flexible fiscal policies replaced the priority of using the nation’s natural
resources for the country’s development. What’s more, the oil company had also “publicly heralded
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policy to maximize volume in disregard of OPEC quotas and price objectives,” causing the 1998 oil
price crisis.21 Chavez knew drastic modifications had to occur. Consequently, the leader began by
appointing Ali Rodriguez Araque to head the state oil monopoly, perhaps one of the most effective
moves by the president. In 2000, the oil minister managed to strengthened Venezuela’s role in
OPEC by defending and recovering prices, as well as enforcing the policy on quotas. Rodriguez
would eventually become the secretary general of OPEC while maintaining his position as minister
of energy. But more importantly, the enactment of the Hydrocarbons Law would completely
transform PDVSA, simultaneously angering the opposition. Without the approval of the National
Assembly, in 1991, Chavez legally passed the law (that came into effect January 2002), thus
replacing the Hydrocarbons Law of 1943 and the Nationalization Law of 1975. Basically, the new
initiative strengthened the state's control over oil production and distribution. In other technical
terms, under the law, foreign or private investors "cannot own 50% or more of the capital stock in
joint ventures involved in upstream activities... also provides that private investors may own up to
100% of the capital stock in ventures concerning downstream activities."22 Even so, Chavez did not
have complete authority over the company that had rather remained a global company, nor could
he at the time assert immediate order of the highly bureaucratic institution. That did not stop him,
however, from appointing new board of directors for PDVSA in February 2002, a clear attempt to
begin repairing the damages. On the other side, the president’s opponents interpreted his actions
as exceedingly authoritarian.
The third factor further heating the controversy was the installment of particular land
reforms, primarily the “Ley de Tierra” (Law of the Land). The law mandates a maximum of
permissible hectarage of a farm, determined by the amount of agricultural production. If 80 percent
of the proprietor’s land remains idle, the landowner is subject to inactivity tax or, in extreme cases,
confiscation by the state, which would then be redistributed. Private farmers who increased
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productivity are rewarded as well. Similar regulations applied to Coasts, Fishery, and Aquaculture
Laws, hence “encouraging small-scale artisans.”23 Of course, the opposition quickly jumped at the
issue, accusing the Chavez administration of bypassing its boundaries and thwarting the interests
of the private sector. The rationalization, nonetheless, behind Chavez cannot be easily dismissed.
Coming from a socialist background, the president deems governmental involvement as a
necessary means of shaping a self-sufficient, or “endogenous” Venezuela. The reality is it would be
foolish to disregard the country’s fragile reliance on the exportation of oil and importation of
seemingly everything, and Chavez was not ignorant to this fact. Rather, he introduced the laws
with hopes to cut down on the massive imports of agriculture and raw materials in order to initiate
the country’s endogenous progress: “…[W]e cannot allow the existence of even a hectare of idle
land, because the land must be sowed, the land must be farmed.”24 The reforms are presently in
full gear and still controversial, but the debate was heated more so during their induction.
The tensions between the opposition and Chavistas augmented over these key issues. At
the forefront of the Venezuelan leader’s rivals were the privately-owned media, the wealthy elite
stratum, and the shrinking middle-class. Although the president’s constitutional and economic
changes appeared drastic, they were hardly even given an opportunity to be fully appraised.
Backed by the media, rival political pasties and other challenger, both made up of the old oligarch
and elite, were quick to launch an anti-Chavez campaign. Painting a future of Cuban-like regime,
the opposition rallied a portion of Venezuelans to protest the reforms. The first attempt came in the
form of an attempted coup. One factor must be noted before discussing the aforementioned.
Documentation of the news of the coup and oil strike must be assessed with a grain of salt and
careful reading, while simultaneously considering the opposition’s power.
The reader must take into account anti-Chavez rivals’ accessibility to television, radio, and
print media because they were either supported by or members of the organizations. Notorious for
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their uninhibited attacks on the president are Venevision, Radio Caracas Television, Globovision (a
24-hour satellite news channel), and the two press agencies, El Universal and El Nacional. Each to
a certain degree (at least under American standards) can be guilty of yellow journalism,
questionable muckraking, bias, or all of the above. During the oil strike of December 2002, these
independent media outlets broadcasted an average of 700 pro-strike advertisements,25 and at the
same time, featured or supported leaders of the opposition, such as Oxford-educated lawyer and
leader of the First Justice party Julio Borges and even the former Venezuelan president Carlos
Andres Perez though his credibility was shot by a conviction of embezzlement. Ultimately, what is
essential to bear in mind is that the independent media represents not the poor, but the wealthy
class, a stance taken the moment Chavez stepped into office with socialist lingo. His reforms were
blamed for the economic woes of the country even though as shown before the oligarch shared the
greatest guilt; however, dissidents like Gustavo Cisneros, owner of Venevision TV and head of
various joint ventures with multinationals (i.e. Coca-Cola), interpreted Chavez’s agenda as a threat
to the free market and private property. As a result, with such power, render much influence… and
alliances.
The opposition has done well in marketing its demands to the media and authorities
abroad, especially in the United States. It is no coincidence or secret that many American news
agencies have either downplayed or unrecognized Chavez’s progress and his massive support
base. Not to mention, the Bush administration indirectly funds anti-Chavez groups, like Sumate
which received $53, 000 for aiding in the coordination of the referendum of 2004, through the
National Endowment for Democracy.26 This sort of support, overall, gives the opposition immense
leverage over Chavez as was evident in the 2002 coup attempt.
The events of 11 April 2002 could not be better captured in The Revolution Will Not Be
Televised,27 a documentary of the coup as it occurred. The filmmakers displayed the influential
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power of the media moguls as they rallied demonstrators to the Miraflores presidential palace. The
protestors were met by Chavez supporters, including the Bolaviarian Circles (grassroots
organizations highly loyal to the president), which eventually resulted in a violent clash. Although
the film clearly shows that gunshots were precipitated by the opposition, some of the armed
Chavistas retaliated in defense; the image of their reaction was media-manipulated in favor of the
president’s challengers. To be fair, further investigation would render more accurate details.
Nevertheless, the confrontation was both a divergence and catalyst to orchestrate the capture of
the president. Despite the opposition’s denial to the charges, the only government-run media
channel was shut down, while the independent channels led the populace to believe that Chavez
had resigned. The president, of course, had not signed any resignation, but was kidnapped by
rivals; leading the pack was Pedro Carmona (chief of the Chamber of Commerce) and then army
captain Eduardo Garcia. Within the first day of the takeover, Carmona was inducted as president of
Venezuela and the constitution was eradicated. His fall from leadership was welcomed by the Bush
administration. To their embarrassment, however, Chavez returned. Upon gradual news of the
coup, an overwhelming crowd of Chavistas and other supporters of the government filled the
streets of the Capital, protesting against the unconstitutional takeover and calling for the release of
Chavez. The military soldiers loyal to the president regained control of the palace, and soon
brought the president back into power.
Suddenly, the U.S. became a suspect of funding the coup. Based on BBC News reports,
the secretary general of OPEC, Ali Rodriguez, contended that OPEC “had learned that some Arab
countries were agitating for a new oil embargo against the U.S.” since “they were angry at the U.S.
stance following Israel’s incursions into the Palestinian territories.”28 Consequently, the U.S. would
fear Venezuelan support of an oil embargo. Chavez had attempted to avert the coup by sending a
note to President Bush, assuring him that his country would not join any oil boycott. Even though
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this would solidify the bad relationship between the U.S. and Chavez, the issue would be put in the
back burner as the Venezuela government would have to find and arrest the coup plotters. Not
surprisingly, opponents would charge that the president’s administration was on a witch-hunt.
Granted the leader was persistent on identifying what he called “terrorists,” yet he soon had to
divert his attention to the December 2002 oil strike. Lasting eight weeks, the general strike was
crippling for the economy: “The oil sector shrank by nearly 26 percent as thousands of workers
walked off their jobs.”29 The Venezuelan leader used troops and replacement crews to restart the
oil sector; the protesting workers were sacked though 40,000 employees returned according to the
Chavez administration.30 The economy soon recovered, especially once the strike ended in
January.
While the oil strike persisted, the most interesting development was the media coverage of
United States and Venezuela. As much as there were demonstrators against Chavez, there were
perhaps equally or more supporters of the government regime. According to Robert Palast of
Britain’s Observer, newspapers throughout the U.S. simply headlined protesters’ appeals and
apparent masses in pictures. Palast argues that everyone ignored other demonstrators: “I'd
recently returned from Caracas and watched 100,000 march against President Chavez. I'd filmed
them for BBC Television London. But I also filmed this: a larger march, easily over 200,000
Venezuelans marching in support of their president, Chavez.”31 The previously-mentioned is
indicated primarily for two reasons. First, the importance of approaching Venezuelan news with
caution since reality of life in the country can be quiet effortlessly manipulated. Second, both the
coverage and event are representative of the significant division found between the [wealthy] broad
alliance (consisting of unions, political parties, and private businesses) and the Chavistas, mainly
made of the poor and other grassroots groups. The vote on the recall referendum in August 2004,
overseen by the Carter Center and the OAS (Organization of American States), would prove to
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measure a greater following behind the president who defeated the recall, which asked citizens
whether Chavez should serve the remaining two and half years of his term. The president won with
59% of the vote, stimulating allegations of fraud from the opposition.32 However, former U.S.
President Jimmy Carter silenced Chavez opponents since he observed no foul play though the
ballot system was new—these electronic ballots were the same type used in Florida during the
2004 U.S. presidential election (the author can vouch for their functionality). In response to the
charges, Chavez stated, “I invite my countrymen to talk, even to my most bitter enemies I offer my
hand.”33 In truth, the opposition is still attempting to justify their claims against the president who as
of late is proving the effectiveness of his social programs and regional alliances.
Three Rs: Rapid Results of the Revolution
With much of the turmoil calmed, Chavez’s efforts for el pueblo have been startling. Much
of the success is owed to his administration’s ability to slow capital flight and, more importantly, the
increase in oil prices. By implementing Cadivi, an exchange control agency, companies who wish
to import products to purchase foreign currency are forced to do so through the government
agency. The introduction of Cadivi in early 2003 has increased foreign reserves; in fact, currently
they stand at $26.262 billion, and at the end of last year, the “foreign reserves stood $23.46
billion… in 2003 alone, the foreign reserves of the country expanded by over $6.5bn to $21.299
billion.”34 Although the reserves are controlled by the central bank, Chavez has asked the bank to
use a portion to finance the government’s public programs, which will be automatically delivered as
in the past. The financial gain has effectively distributed the wealth amongst those in greater need
of it though all of Venezuela has faired pretty well with substantial public expenditures.
But the major push behind investment in social projects is the oil revenue. With
Venezuela’s oil price at $40 a barrel, PDVSA has profited considerably, enough to back
government initiatives: “PDVSA spent more than $3.7 billion last [2004] on social and agricultural
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programs, housing, and other public projects—about a third of its earning.”35 According to Ian
Bruce of BBC News, the oil company will continue investing in social projects, about another $6
billion to public finances, against the recommendations of the IMF, which suggest the state save
the extra money.36 The likelihood of that, however, is slim when taking into account Chavez’s
vision. The president is demanding to see what he calls the Three Rs, rapid results of the
revolution; in other words, the Venezuelan leader is encouraging the government to move quickly
in implementing, enforcing, and developing the different reforms and social projects. This includes
the president’s missions, created earlier in his term, that cover areas from education to health. For
instance, Mision Ribas gives thousands of Venezuelans the chance to finish their secondary
education, amongst other educational opportunities. Figure 1 summarizes other missions that
exemplify Chavez’s vision for a more egalitarian and self-sufficient country. The latter being a
major goal for Chavez, thus the reason for his recent emphasis over the enforcement of the
agricultural and land reforms.
In 22 March 2005, the Venezuelan leader reiterated during his regular broadcast of “Hello,
President” (where he makes announcements and answers calls) the importance of creating an
endogenous state by not only cutting down on importation, but also promoting agricultural growth.
He contended that he had “approved approximately 70bn bolivars in additional resources to launch
the expansion phase of his agricultural plan,” mentioning also that “both the production of staples
and the yield per hectare would be increased, and urged private farmers to join the government in
setting up endogenous development centers.”37 Clearly, Chavez’s aims are to fortify the country’s
agricultural foundation and minimize the dependency on oil by providing financial assistance to
farmers (i.e. countless loans are granted) and achieving feasible ways to build the infrastructure of
the industry, especially in the rural areas; that is, he has been able to utilize funds from reserves to
construct processing plants for foods, such as soy and corn.
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Figure I:

Missions

Objectives

Mision Vuelvan
Caras

With participation of the people and government, the mission aims to transform
society and the economy of the country through educational and vocational
programs. The government grants scholarships to participants.

Mision Miranda

To effectively organize, register, control, and retrain the National Arms Force
reserve (FAN) to ultimately develop the military defense and maintain cooperation of
the internal order and their active participation in developing the nation.

Mision Mercal

To establish an effective market and commercialization of nutritional products and
others of primary necessity, while maintaing quality, low prices, and easy access by
incorporating groups, small businesses, and organized co-operatives within the
Mercal program. Also plans provisions.

Mision
Guaicaipuro

To restitute the rights of the Indigenous population in accordance with the
Venezuelan constitution by stimulating internal development to guarantee their
enjoyment of their civil rights (I.e. health, education, etc.).

Mision Sucre

To offer an alternative and accessible opportunity of achieving Higher Education for
those who did not continue their studies because of the lack of available seats in
universities. Includes the creation of the Bolavariana University of Venezuela.

Mision Piar

Mision Identitad

Mision Barrio
Adentro

To achieve the sustainable development of the mining communities and thus to
dignify the quality of life of the small miners.
It guarantees that all citizens of Venezuela from birth are offered a constitutional
right to identity, indispensable so that citizens can participate in progressive actions
of the State, such as the missions; essentially recognizes citizenship.
To offer neighborhoods with health care via construction of hospitals and
infrastructure. The mission also includes the assistance of Cuban medical and
international professionals.

Furthermore, Chavez has established strategic alliances with Latin American countries to continue
developing the agricultural sector: “In 2004, Argentine exports to Venezuela tripled from 2003,
while Venezuelan exports to Argentina grew five times. Venezuela exports to Argentina fuels worth
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$200 mln (155.5 mln euro) per year, which are paid back in agriculture machinery and livestock.”38
Regional agreements such as the former, however, will be discussed in further detail later.
Ultimately, the president’s actions are commendable considering these are agricultural
initiatives that most Latin American countries would embrace if accessible and undeterred by
multinational corporations (MNCs). The problem in most, if not all, of the region is its lack of
infrastructure and government’s public expenditure along with the unfair trade system of the global
economy (this latter issue will not remain untouched). Just consider the typical situation in
countries especially within Central America: If the state regains or buys land back within their soil,
who will work it, where are the technological means and intellectual services, and will the state be
able to subsidize? Hence, poor Latin American countries must depend significantly on importation
and foreign [exploitative] privatization. As much as critics may point fingers at President Chavez for
his reforms, the fact is that he has managed to work around the conflict in a more conducive
manner. The Venezuelan leader recognizes the integral role of the private sector and foreign
investments in a functioning economy, which demonstrates why the land laws are essential no
matter how controversial. The Ley de Tierra has been pushed more pressingly as of late; many
large estates have been under review to determine whether they are productive or idle. A national
land commission created by recent decree (January 2005) has inspected various estates owned by
the 5% of the country, occupying almost 80% of land.39 In March 2005, the state actually
confiscated a British owned cattle ranch, El Charcote, for providing property document that did not
prove the land belonged to the owner—Vestey Group. Moreover, though Vestey deny charges, the
land was deemed idle. The group will appeal, but as is the ranch has already been renamed Pedro
Perez Delgado “Maisanta” Endogenous Development Center where many of the poor have begun
ranching and working to set up cooperatives.40
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In another effort to fend off exploitation of the country, on 15 April 2005, the Chavez
administration decided to revise numerous oil pacts with private companies to make certain they
are complying with Venezuela’s 2004 decision to raise the royalties paid by foreign oil companies:
“The companies have to take all the necessary measures to bring the operating agreements in
compliance with the latest legislation within six month, which includes that they should be turned
into mixed capital companies.”41 Indeed, the state now requires that the private oil companies pay
their dues in a form rightly profitable to the host company. The raise in corporate income tax
ensures that unlike the 1% in royalty they used to pay, the companies now pay 30% in royalty and
50% tax on profits. If they fail to do so, they must leave the country. Undeniably, this recourse is
aided by the necessity and valued business of oil; for, in other Latin American countries, large firms
control particular industries, having more power to control supply and price than do firms in more
competitive industries, while managing to control resources (e.g. capital, technology). In view of
such land and oil reforms, Chavez has definitely turned the tables in hopes of achieving rapid
results for the state and people.
Other notable social initiatives, by the head of Venezuela, are Plan Bolivar 2000,
Education Decree 1011 and 3444, and the “Buy Venezuela” policy. Plan Bolivar was conceived as
joint civic-military operation, which centered on programs to reverse the deterioration of the public
infrastructure. The plan provides food aid to the poor via the military’s infrastructure, and puts
soldiers to work in fixing houses in poor communities. Although an ingenious method to put the
military to use, Chavez’s opponents criticized because of the concept behind it: a civilian-military
junta, reminiscent of Castro’s Cuba. The education decrees also received some lip since it allows
for the Ministry of Education to send professionals to inspect schools and teachers in order to
evaluate the improvements necessary. Specifically, Decree 3444 gives the government the right to
oversee university budgets and planning. Critics say that universities will lose autonomy and that
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these efforts are hostile to private education.42 The argument, as of yet, is unfounded since
Chavez’s administration has merely been enhancing the education system that suffered in the past
due to cut in public expenditures. The last policy above-mentioned is a government program that
promotes small and medium size industries by giving them access to credit facilities disbursed by
Banco Popular, a banking entity.
In retrospective analysis of Chavez’s political and social agenda, the portrait of Fidel
Castro is eclipsed by the Venezuelan leader’s Bolavarian revolution, which unquestionably walks a
fine line between Western capitalism and Soviet socialism (or communism). And, therein lies the
clash between the affluent opposition and the poor, the United States and the Latin American
pueblos. The revolution strays away enough from neoliberalism to anger critics though it embraces
few aspects of communism for the poor. Venezuela’s societal division parallels the age-old struggle
between American capitalism and Latin America’s nationalist integrity. Yet, Chavez successfully
maintains the direction of the third way, 21st century socialism, as he truly grasps the magnitude of
his role within an oil-driven state and a continent on the verge of change.
Bolivar’s Dream
The unfortunate reality of Central and South America has been its failure to attain political
stability; of course, the majority of the fault lies in Western powers’ interventionist foreign policies,
such as those implemented during the Cold War. Nevertheless, social and political factors have
never fallen in a sort of equilibrium throughout the region to allow for a united revolutionary change.
Consider the efforts of Che Guevara; after the Cuban revolution, his efforts in the heart of South
America, Bolivia, to rally a communist or nationalist movement faltered. Although U.S. intelligence
thwarted his plans, the fact was that most Latin Americans were not prepared or aware of their
individual power, nor were some countries in good terms. In other words, internal and external
effects have always sabotaged any chance for a unified front that could attempt to ascertain true
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sovereignty, self-sufficiency, and development. Some may see a futility or needlessness of a Latin
American union; however, before the region defended nationalism or [Latino] Marxism, it was
glorifying the ideology of Simon Bolivar, El Liberator or The Liberator of South America from
Spanish forces. He envisioned expanding Gran Columbia, which at the time was a federation of
present-day Venezuela, Colombia, Panama, and Ecuador: "I aspire to no other glory than the
consolidation of Colombia. You must all work for the supreme good of a united nation.... My last
wishes are for the happiness of our native land. If my death will help to… promote national unity, I
shall go to my grave in peace."43 As mentioned in the beginning of this essay, this sentiment has
reemerged. Sharing Bolivar’s passion is Chavez who upholds the concept throughout his rhetoric
and regional alliances. His efforts have indeed brought more countries together despite few
disagreements. For the first time since Bolivar, Latin America has actually moved towards a viable
possibility of regional integration.
The opportunity has sprung mainly due to the flourishing of left-leaning leaders, such as
Brazil’s Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva and Argentina’s Nestor Kirchner, who Chavez has continuously
maintained positive relations. In attempt to construct the Latin American bloc, the Venezuelan
president has pursued various agreements with many nations of the region, especially with South
American neighbors. The latest developments are remarkable improvements and signs of
strengthening collective agenda. On 11 May 2005, energy ministers of Venezuela, Brazil, and
Argentina completed the draft designing Petrosul, an energy coalition Chavez has been pushing for
sometime. What started in February as a strategic alliance, focused on implementing nineteen
projects for infrastructure, the energy and mining sectors, and fostering import substitution goods,
between Lula and Chavez, later evolved into a trilateral alliance. By March, the tripartite pact
expanded on their earlier political, energy, and cultural agreements, while promising further talks
over the creation of Petrosul and Telesur. The energy coalition will permit the creation of an
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institution responsible for overseeing the coordination of the all three countries’ energy bases: “…
Pretrosul will englobe the petroleum exploration companies of the three countries—the Brazilian
Petrobras, the Argentine Enarsa and the Venezuelan PDVSA.”44 Chavez has hopes that this will be
an establishment of equal influence as OPEC.
Telesur, on the other hand, is a proposed television channel with information about and for
South American countries, an alternative from CNN. Chavez has been attempting to convince
other countries to join the initiative, and has so far succeeded; Uruguay’s President Tabare
Vasquez has pledged his support, accompanied by Cuba, Brazil, and Argentina.45 Clearly, these
measures are symbolic of a region’s urgency and confidence in building bridges of unification along
the line of the European Union. In fact, on the table since December 2004 is an agreement
between all twelve South American countries to establish the South American Community of
Nations. Chavez, of course, has backed the agreement entirely, suggesting “to set up a fund that
could help countries facing financial difficulties.”46 The Venezuelan president obviously has his
mind set on resurrecting Bolivar’s dream, fully acknowledging this is a much needed dosage for a
region attempting to stay afloat globalization.
But unlike other Latin American leaders, Chavez is remaining on a course ignorant of U.S.
influence. One cannot deny that the developed nation’s track record with Latin America is mostly
bathed in blood, intimidation, and discord. Thus the reason behind Chavez’s ongoing trail to
cement as many trade agreements within the region and Far East nations as possible. He has
signed over ten agreements with Latin American countries, known as the Acuerdos de
Cooperacion Energetica, agreements over energy (oil) trade. In April 2005, Chile’s President
Ricardo Lagos and the Venezuelan leader signed a series of energy, scientific, and trade
cooperation agreement; the accordance will also allow the oil state to provide Chile with crude to
“lighten the workload of [Chile’s] refineries while expanding overseas markets.”47 What’s more,
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Chavez’s recent cooperation agreements (March 2005) with Brazil, Columbia, and Spain to boost
integration and strengthen security within the region not only demonstrates his commitment to
solidifying diplomatic/ economic relations, but also proves that he is no enemy to Columbia. There
were American suspicions that Chavez was funding the Columbia’s major underground guerillas,
FARC. The president has always denied the accusations, proving so were his talks with Columbian
President Alvaro Uribe. Currently, they maintain peaceful relations despite Uribe’s strong alliance
with the United States.
One of Chavez’s more substantial accomplishments is gaining membership into
MERCOSUR (Common Market of the South). Established in 1991, the MERCOSUR is a fourpartner association between Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Brazil that created a free-trade
zone, welcoming the opening of economies while seeking to contain them. The customs union
already signed a Free Trade Agreement with the European Union. Now, Kirchner and Lula have
welcomed Venezuela though the country must first follow certain steps, includes the issue of tariffs,
in order to achieve full member status. Adding to the list of regional concords, Chavez has
sustained strong alliance with Cuba. In fact, Chavez and Castro share a close friendship that has
rendered several trade agreements. Dating back to 2000, the island has received 53,000 barrels a
day of Venezuelan oil at reduced prices.48 In exchange, the oil state has received over 20,000
professionals (i.e. teachers, doctors, etc.), intelligence agents, and military advisers to aid
Chavez’s misiones and the overall development of the nation. Among other notable agreements
between the leaders, ALBA (Alternativa Bolivariana para las América) is designed as an alternative
to the FTAA. Essentially, ALBA pushes for solidarity with the economically weakest countries, with
the aim of achieving a free trade area in which all of its members benefit. Aside from the fact that
the overall relationship between Castro and Chavez is highly criticized by the U.S. and company,
the alliance has shared successes and contributed to regional integration.
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Important to recognize is the president’s evident dedication to establishing constructive
lines of communication and exchanges with his neighbors, which simultaneously enriching the
social welfare of Venezuelans. Take for instance, the intellectual services gained from Cuba, or
consider Chavez’s recent agreement with Kirchner to export fuels worth $200 million per year to be
paid back in agriculture machinery and livestock.49 Such efforts undermine the validity behind
criticism against the Venezuelan leader since he has managed to truly shatter the image of a
Communist authoritarian, and rather exemplify a profound loyalty to Bolivar’s dream.
Mapping Latin America 2020
Yet, to some skeptics of Chavez, these strategic alliances are interpreted as influential
means of spreading anti-American sentiment throughout the Southern belt. In fact, the old
language of the Cold War is often resurrected. In an article written by Otto J Reich, Chavez along
with Castro is signalized as one of major players that constitute the Western axis of evil. Putting
many of the unfounded and exaggerated charges against Chavez aside, the former assistant
secretary of state for the National Security Council does make one valid point and question:
“Not only is Castro still in power, but he is being kept afloat financially by Venezuela’s oilfueled charity; the Sandinistas are making a comeback in Nicaragua; and violent radical
groups menace democracy from Bolivia to Haiti. In recent years, left-of-center leaders
have come to power in Chile, Brazil, Ecuador, Argentina, Bolivia, the Dominican Republic,
and Uruguay. Should we worry about these leftists?”50
Not surprisingly, Reich says yes, believing that leftists would be the cause for regional instability
ranging from an increase in crime to uninhibited radicalism. His argument is unreasonably
unsubstantiated (and deserves no further analysis), however he brings to the table a likely portrait
of most Latin American leaders in the near future. What Reich fails to acknowledge, though, are
the legitimate efforts of Latin American leaders today (as has been made clear) to form a united,
functional front, a necessary and long awaited vision of the Latin American populace. And, to
believe that future leftist leaders, like the possible candidate Daniel Ortega of the Sandinistas, will
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threaten the peace, is equivalent to still believing in the domino effect of the Cold War. The
underlying fact is that although the Latin American psyche bears a disgruntled memory of the
American past wrongs, the region does not live in the past. For, the root of anti-American sentiment
today is founded in the unfair system of trade and “free” market between the Global South and
North, the developing and developed countries. This is an issue that finds its solution in
strengthening both the nation itself and the regional integration, not violence.
Needless to say, the reality appears to be that many Latin American states will strengthen
their soil by electing left-leaning leaders, like Chavez, who will attempt to counter the U.S. imposed
neo-liberal economic model. But, integration between Central and South America is far more
difficult. According to the NIC report, Mapping the Global Future, experts predict that by the year
2020, past global changes could “deepen divisions and serve to split Latin America apart in
economic investment, and trade policy terms,”51 thus weakening the influence of the overall
continent in world affairs. To an extent, this is possible because many of the South American
countries are developing partnerships with Asia and Europe, while Central America (especially
Mexico) have become increasingly dependent on the U.S. and Canada. Yet, this may not be
entirely conceivable if Reich’s prediction is true, or what the NIC report details is also credible:
“Regional experts foresee an increasing risk of the rise of charismatic, self-styled populist leaders,
historically common in the region, who play on popular concerns over inequities between ‘haves’
and ‘have-nots’ in the weakest states in Central America and Andean countries, along with parts of
Mexico.”52
Other than sharing similarities with Reich’s argument, the statement is also a clear allusion
to Chavez. If true, however, certain Central American states will follow the steps of many South
American leaders, especially those of Venezuela’s leader; and thus, they will look to the East for
alliances, as they should considering China and India’s emerging status. In fact, the NIC report
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even acknowledges that the two Eastern nations will become major economic powers that will
challenge U.S. influence in global affairs. And, Chavez is not ignorant to these developments. He
has signed seven agreements with India, including selling oil to the country, and twenty
agreements with China, also involving oil sale. The president contends, “These agreements aim to
promote Venezuela’s new, productive economy… and they want to transfer technology with us.”53
Indeed, the strategic alliances are profitable and, more importantly, conducive to Venezuela’s
future status in the globe.
Accompanied by leaders like Kirchner, Lula, and Lagos, Chavez is setting the example for
the practical manner of channeling anti-American sentiment through diplomacy with the rest of the
major players, while at the same time strengthening regional ties. Ultimately, the only threat
standing before the U.S. is its own image of the old Cold War, world-policing force.
Chavez in the future
Of course, one cannot completely dismiss Chavez’s faults. The man, by any other name,
is still a politician, and like any politician, he is guilty of slight nepotism. Many of the PDVSA board
members he replaced in 2002 were close friends or family members of the president. However,
what remains to be seen are the charges of censorship and “undemocratic” behavior. Along with
the opposition, the Human Rights Watch has expressed concern over allegations that Chavez’s
administration is intent on censoring the news media and unlawfully arresting anti-Chavez activists
who played a major role in the coup and the oil strike. The nongovernmental organization and
company should carefully investigate the validity behind these accusations considering that
Chavez has never stopped the Venezuelan people from demonstrating, or the news media from
attacking him on live television. As of late, nevertheless, Chavez did pass a law with language
similar to one of the many FCC (Federal Communications Commission) regulations in the United
States. The law simply allows a federal agency to oversee that broadcasted information will not
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incite violence [against the government]. Considering the distorted information provided by most
private news agencies in Venezuela, which initiated the 2002 coup, the law comes in good timing
and nowhere near reflects the ingredients of a “gag law,” as the opposition nicknamed the
legislation.
What’s more, the United States has been more vocal than usual in the past two years,
accusing the president of undemocratic behavior. Not only has this analysis shown the lack of truth
behind such a charge, but there is also a hypocrisy that cannot be ignored. Many of the American
allegations and consternations against Chavez can be easily attributed to the Bush administration.
For instance, Rumsfeld and Secretary of State Condleezza Rice have both admonished Chavez for
buying weapons from Russia and Spain, as well as enlarging his military. They believe these are
means of destabilizing the region and causing an arms race. This is, by far, an audacity (especially
since the U.S. sell arms to both India and Pakistan, two warring nations) to point fingers at a leader
who has done more for his country than any other Venezuelan president, and has proven to want
nothing more than peaceful regional integration. Furthermore, whether wrong or not, Chavez has
the legal right to equip his militia in order to strengthen national security and development, a
justification that U.S. officials have themselves sustained for their own country.
In due course, perhaps the United States will reevaluate its stance against Chavez; they
should attempt to since polls show that Chavez is likely to win the 2006 presidential elections in
Venezuela, thus extending the Bolavarian Revolution. Even if he is not victorious, his political
rhetoric and social reforms will not be easily forgotten.
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